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ABSTRACT 
Understanding Stanislavskian practice in the UK conservatoire is a complex task for at least three 
reasons.  Firstly, there is the challenge of grasping the system itself.  Secondly, there is the 
complexity of tracing the multiple branches of the Stanislavski “family tree.”  Finally, as David Shirley 
explains, the transmission of his ideas to the UK was a “piecemeal” process extended over many 
years, often obscured by imperfect translations and limited contact with Russian practitioners.  The 
additional task of revitalizing the system for the twenty-first century is, therefore, highly 
problematic.  This paper explores how cognitive science might provide some powerful tools for such 
a task.  I begin by discussing some of the aesthetic and scientific ideas that shaped Stanislavski’s view 
of emotion, including the widely-reported influence of Théodule Ribot.  I then consider how 
Stanislavski departed from Ribot and developed a distinctive, multi-faceted theory of emotion in the 
creative process, a conception that incorporated Vakhtangov’s notion of “affective emotion.”  I pose 
the questions, what exactly is “affective emotion,” how widely is it understood in the UK, and is it 
supported by the current science?  I then turn to contemporary theories of emotion, drawing 
particularly on Damasio’s updating of Jamesian psychology.  I propose a link between “affective 
emotion” and Damasio’s “as-if” body loop.  Furthermore, I discuss some key questions relating to 
future actor training: how might we need to reconfigure our practice in the light of the science and 
what alternative models of acted emotion have emerged to compete with the Stanislavskian 
paradigm?  
  
Our general goals for Performance and Cognition are to invite theatre and 
performance scholars to incorporate many of the insights of cognitive science into 
their work and to begin considering all of their research projects from the 
perspective of cognitive studies.1  
 
In recent years, it has become relatively commonplace to hear about cognitive science at theatre 
and performance conferences.  Many have responded to McConachie and Hart’s invitation to use 
cognitive studies to illuminate performance issues.  There are several such contributions at the S 
Word conference.  In my paper, I’m proposing a connection between one idea from the world of 
acting and another from the world of neurology, namely, Stanislavski and Vakhtangov’s conception 
of “affective emotion” and Antonio Damasio’s hypothesis of the “as-if ” body loop.  But to start, it 
might be worth playing Devil’s Advocate.  Why should performance scholars and practitioners 
bother with cognitive science at all?  Western theatre practice has its own 2500-year-old history, so 
why should it need interventions from other disciplines?  Surely what counts is not what is 
empirically provable, but the subjective experience of performer and audience.  As Stanislavski 
remarks, “in the theatre, knowing means feeling.”2  Finally, isn’t it extraordinarily dangerous, 
arrogant even, to attempt to dip in to highly complex fields without in-depth specialist knowledge? 
As Rhonda Blair remarks, “it is easy to misappropriate complex material such as that produced by 
scientific research; we must be mindful of being non-expert.”3  
It might be healthy to acknowledge these and other objections to the use of science, but without 
doubt, practitioners have turned to one branch of it or another in search of insights, particularly the 
fields of psychology and neuroscience.  Stanislavski’s use of French psychologist Théodule Ribot to 
expand his understanding of emotion has been widely acknowledged.  Uta Hagen sought scientific 
verification for her adaptation of Stanislavskian exercises from two psychologists, Jacques Palaci and 
Harvey White.4  More recently, theatre director Katie Mitchell drew on Damasio’s work to develop a 
new approach to emotional expression.5  The motivation seems to have been a search for a better 
understanding of natural processes and a desire for a foundation for acting practice that goes 
beyond the subjective, that is both durable and universal.  McConachie himself argues that 
performance scholarship would benefit from the secure epistemological foundations offered by 
cognitive science.  In particular, he applies Popper’s idea of “falsifiability” to theatre studies.  Science 
no longer claims to have discovered truth for all time, but it does produce highly reliable theories 
that explain the available evidence.  These theories have the additional virtue of being subject to 
challenge and replacement, if they no longer provide adequate explanations of the data.6   
My reasons for drawing on neurology are influenced by the context of twenty-first century actor 
training.  In the post-modern world, we are aware of a bewildering variety of training strategies, 
theatrical styles and potential platforms for the exercise of the actor’s professional skills.  How might 
we best prepare actors for this complex and challenging environment?  If there are cognitive and 
emotional processes that are inherent in our biology, might this knowledge form a reliable and 
flexible basis for an approach to actor education that is applicable to all modes of training, styles of 
performance and media channels?  Moreover, could discoveries in science act as a driver for deeper 
reflection, renewal of practice and innovation in drama schools?   
My contention is that the ability to arouse and communicate an apparently authentic emotional 
response to imaginary circumstances is as important today as it was in Stanislavski’s era, albeit for 
different reasons.  One such instance is provided by acting coach Rocco dal Vera, who has prepared 
many actors for Hollywood screen tests.  He reports that when casting directors select scenes for 
actors to play for audition purposes, they invariably choose the extracts from the film or TV drama 
that have the highest stakes and the most extreme emotional demands: a father discovers his 
beloved daughter has been kidnapped; a police officer tells a mother that her only child has been 
killed.7  Evidently, what they want to test is the actor’s ability to produce intense displays of emotion 
on demand, knowing that is what is required by director and audience alike.  In my experience of 
working in the UK conservatoire, currently the Birmingham School of Acting, students are frequently 
anxious about how to generate a convincing emotional response, an anxiety that is often focussed 
on a dread of what they see as the ultimate acting challenge: having to cry on cue.  In this respect, 
these American and British actors are facing the same challenge that Stanislavski tried to address in 
early twentieth-century Russia: how do you control the uncontrollable?  How do you consciously 
generate a response that is normally automatic and frequently subconscious?  Although there may 
be elements of continuity in the challenges confronting actors from different eras, it is equally clear 
that the context of their work has changed radically.  This means the reasons for the centrality of 
emotion have shifted.  Today our TV screens are populated with images of suffering on an 
apocalyptic scale, whether caused by natural disasters or man-made catastrophes.  On a more trivial 
level, reality TV shows deliberately manipulate contestants into displays of arrogance, 
disappointment or grief.  They are under pressure to produce extravagant displays of emotion in 
order to stay on the show and remain the centre of public attention.  Actors working in a realistic 
vein must compete with genuinely traumatic events and flagrant performances of emotion on 
prime-time TV.  Stanislavski’s conception of emotion evolved in a very different context, which I will 
outline very briefly, citing just two of a number of aesthetic influences which also include Pushkin, 
Gogol and Shchepkin.   
Benedetti argues that the critic Vissarion Belinski “set the agenda for all discussion on the 
relationship between art and society for a century or more.”8  Belinski’s view that the arts and 
sciences had a joint responsibility for improving society was shared by Tolstoy.  Tolstoy suggests that 
the role of science is to discover what is important and true and that of art is to transform this 
knowledge from “perception” to “feeling.”  Furthermore, for Tolstoy, the civilizing effect of the 
transmission of emotion is the very purpose of art:  
To evoke in oneself a feeling one has once experienced, and having evoked it in 
oneself, then, by means of movements, lines, colours, sounds, or forms expressed in 
words, so to transmit that feeling that others may experience the same feeling – this 
is the activity of art.9  
Ribot’s view of the role of emotion in art was consistent with the thinkers and practitioners who 
influenced Stanislavski.  In his work on the creative imagination, he remarks that “the emotional 
factor yields in importance to no other; it is the ferment without which no creation is possible.”10  In 
some respects, Ribot’s influence on Stanislavski is obvious, not least in the chapter of An Actor’s 
Work entitled “Emotion Memory,” which mentions Ribot by name.11  The title is taken from Ribot’s 
article “La Memoire Affective,” first published in Russian in 1899.  Ribot passed on a number of key 
ideas, for example, that there are two types of emotional memory: one that is the intellectual recall 
that an emotion-provoking event took place, which Ribot calls “abstract,” and a rarer form that 
involves a full reproduction of the original physiological response, which Ribot calls “concrete.”  But 
while Ribot regarded concrete memory as extremely rare, Stanislavski saw it as a trainable faculty 
that is essential for the actor.  A less obvious connection between the two men is the idea of a link 
between action and emotion.  Ribot constructs a hierarchical model of the evolution of affective 
life12:  
Complex, ‘abstract’ emotions (religious, moral, intellectual and aesthetic) 
Simple, innate emotions (associated with childhood) 
Survival needs (including hunger and thirst) 
Protoplasmic sensibility (attraction, repulsion, arrest of movement) 
 
Occupying the base level is the pre-conscious sensibility of micro-organisms. At the next level, we 
find drives related to survival such as hunger and thirst.  This provides the foundation for the so-
called “primitive” emotions, such as fear and anger, and finally, at an advanced stage of 
development, the human experiences “complex” emotions, including a sense of moral 
discrimination and aesthetic appreciation.  Within this model, the fundamental constituent of 
affective life is the protoplasmic attraction towards and repulsion from other objects.  Ribot 
describes this activity using an action-based vocabulary reminiscent of the rehearsal room: the life of 
feeling consists of a “tendency” towards movement or arrest of movement.  Tendency embraces 
both psychological and physiological aspects and is synonymous with needs, appetites, instincts, 
desires, inclinations.13  In other words, Ribot proposes a fundamental biological connection between 
action and emotion at the end of the nineteenth century.  In the scope of this paper, it is impossible 
to offer a full account of Stanislavski’s complex conception of emotion.  I will mention only a few key 
points.  First of all, emotion memory as the basis for experiencing remained an essential element of 
his thinking, well into the 30s.14  Although recurring emotion is essential to experiencing on stage, 
Stanislavski offers only the vaguest definitions of emotion and feeling.  As Sharon Carnicke remarks: 
“Stanislavsky never gives a firm description of how a secondary emotion actually differs from the 
first time it occurs except that it is more controllable.”15  What we can say with some confidence is 
that Stanislavski had little interest in the raw emotion of an actual traumatic event.  The famous 
episode of the trolley car vividly illustrates the point.  Fictional student Kostya Nazvanov describes 
how his feelings change in the course of repeated visits to the site of the accident.  At first, he is 
revolted by the sight of the fatally injured beggar.  On his second visit, he feels compassion and 
indignation on behalf of the victim.  Finally, he experiences a sense of awe inspired by the symbolic 
properties of the tragic scene.  Later still, he associates the event with apparently less serious 
incidents: a previous non-fatal trolley car derailment and a Serb grieving for his pet monkey.  Tortsov 
comments on this process, contrasting the “crudely naturalistic” details of Kostya’s first impression 
with the symbolic quality of the transformed images, illustrating the difference between the raw 
material of life and what is suitable for the stage:  
Time is a wonderful filter, a powerful purifier of memories, of feelings one has had.  
Moreover time is a great artist.  It not only purifies, it lends poetry to memory.16  
Although Stanislavski’s thought is sometimes opaque, some of the features of his idea of acted 
emotion are evident here.  Raw experience is only suitable for artistic purposes when it has been 
transformed by a process of distillation, elevation and association.  Emotion memories are useful 
when they have been processed to the point of being controllable.  Elsewhere, he also states that 
acted emotion can be more intense than real life and that the joy of public solitude is an experience 
unique to the stage.17  What begins to emerge is a conception of acted emotion that is governed by 
specific principles, distinct from those that condition emotional response in life.  This idea is more 
fully articulated by Stanislavski’s protégé, Yevgeny Vakhtangov.  In a lecture delivered in 1914, 
Vakhtangov poses the question, “where do feelings come from and what is the essence of 
experiencing on stage?”, making a distinction between “real life” feelings and “stage feelings.”  
… in life our feelings are always aroused by real causes.  No such causes exist on 
stage.  They always demand and we can do no more than accept them.  The question 
then arises: can these conventions arouse real feeling in us?  Under no 
circumstances.  They not only cannot evoke real feelings, they should not, otherwise 
the stage would cease to be art.  The origin of our stage feelings, which are not 
similar to our normal, real feelings, is not the conventions, but our capacity to repeat 
experiences I spoke of earlier.  And this repeated experience is not the same as real-
life experiencing.  And so, in opposition to real-life emotions, we will define our stage 
emotion as affective emotion.  They are governed by quite different laws from those 
that guide our emotions in life itself.18  
Vakhtangov goes on to discuss the properties of this hypothetical stage emotion.  Unlike life 
emotions, “affective emotions” can be rapidly dismissed on leaving the stage.  Affective emotions do 
not engulf and exhaust actors in the same way that actual fear or other basic emotions might do, so 
it is possible to play a demanding role without undermining one’s physical or mental health. 
Vakhtangov also cites the example of a botched stage-fight, in which the actor accidentally strikes 
their partner.  In such cases, the audience feels sympathy for the wounded actor rather than the 
affronted character and is thus removed from the fictional world.  So an additional “law” of affective 
emotion might be that it belongs exclusively to the aesthetic realm.  Creative joy is also an essential 
element of Vakhtangov’s practice.19  Here, I summarise what seem to be the principal features of the 
Stanislavski-Vakhtangov conception of Affective Emotion:  
• Affective emotion consists of repeated feelings experienced in the present, whose source 
is the personal life of the actor.  
• All people have experienced the full spectrum of emotions, so their own emotional 
repertoire can always be adapted to the circumstances of the play.  
• Affective emotions can be readily dismissed, to be replaced rapidly by another emotion as 
required.  
• Affective emotions are enjoyable to play and do not leave the actor physically or mentally 
damaged.  
• Affective emotions can be more intense than those experienced in life.  
• Affective emotions belong exclusively to the aesthetic realm.  
• Affective emotions can co-exist with “life” emotions, because of the phenomenon of dual 
consciousness.  
 
Affective Emotion, understood as a type of emotion specific to the stage, has, to my knowledge, 
received little or no attention in the West.  Its relative neglect in the literature leads to a new set of 
questions.  Is it an issue of theoretical or historical interest only, with little application to 
contemporary training?  Regardless of scientific validity, is it a useful construct for actors, perhaps 
helping them preserve their psychological health?  Or is it an idea that has some resonance with 
contemporary science and might it, therefore, as I suggested earlier, provide us with a relatively 
secure and flexible basis for the emotional component of actor training in the future?   
Since the days of William James and Ribot, emotion science has branched out in a bewildering 
variety of directions, including psychology, aesthetics, ethology, linguistics and anthropology. 
Research tools have been developed which were undreamt of in Stanislavski’s era: voxel-based 
morphometry, functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Magnetoencephalography, for example, 
enable studies of brain anatomy and processes, including emotional response.20  In one paper, it is 
impossible to do justice to the wide range of discoveries that this explosion of activity has generated. 
Here, I can only mention some of the major debates:  
• Are there any such things as basic or universal emotions or are all emotions socially 
constructed?  
• How does the interaction of genetic heritage and cultural influence condition our 
emotional expression?  
• Do emotions have an identifiable physiological “signature?”  
 
One of the features of some of this work is a convergence between the preoccupations of artists and 
scientists.  Memory, the unconscious, a sense of self derived from the body and the nature of 
creativity are just some of the issues of mutual interest.  For example, Damasio’s frequent use of 
theatrical metaphors is indicative of his preoccupation with both cultural developments and 
scientific practice as manifestations of human consciousness.  His remark that all “emotions use the 
body as their theater” is typical.21  He thinks of human institutions, such as the arts, as extensions of 
the homeostatic function.  Above all, he insists that understanding the biological foundation for 
artistic activity in no way diminishes the wonder of human creativity.22  
In order to illuminate the concept of Affective Emotion, I propose to focus on one, or to be precise, 
two of Damasio’s hypotheses, the body loop and the “as-if” body loop.  But first, I need to briefly 
define some terms.  Damasio makes a distinction between “emotion,” meaning the cascade of 
somatic responses that ensues automatically in response to an “emotionally sufficient” stimulus, and 
“feeling,” which is the conscious perception of the subjective state triggered by the bodily changes.23  
The body loop is a relatively straightforward idea.  It refers to the constant exchange of neurological 
signals between brain and the remainder of the body via the upper brain stem.  This perpetual traffic 
enables the brain to construct what Damasio calls “maps” of the ongoing condition of the body.  
These maps consist of patterns of activated neurons that can represent not just changes in bodily 
states, but also external objects and even maps of maps.  The principal way we generate a feeling of 
emotion occurs when our brain maps the bodily changes caused by a stimulus.  These maps then 
form the substrate for the conscious subjective experience of emotion.  However, Damasio proposes 
an additional mechanism which he calls the “as-if” body loop.  I will let Damasio describe this 
himself:  
As the name suggests, it is a sleight of hand.  The brain regions that initiate the 
typical emotion cascade can also command body-mapping regions, such as the 
insula, to adopt the pattern they would have adopted once the body signalled the 
emotional state to it.  In other words, the triggering regions tell the insula to shape 
up, to configure its firing “as if” it were receiving signals describing emotional state 
X.24  
Simply put, Damasio suggests that the brain is capable of simulating a body state.  It’s tempting to 
describe it as the neurological equivalent of the “magic if.”  He accounts for the existence of such a 
mechanism in evolutionary terms.  Smart brains, he argues, are lazy, so search for means of 
streamlining processes.  Full-scale emotional response is time-consuming and saps precious energy, 
so if the same ends can be achieved with less effort, why not, as he puts it, “cut to the chase?”25 
Moreover, Damasio links his hypothesis with Rizzolatti’s well-known experiments with macaques.  
He describes mirror neurons as the ultimate “as-if” device, suggesting that our ability to experience 
the body states of others is grounded on our ability to simulate our own body states.  To put it 
another way, we are hard-wired for empathy.  A number of features of Damasio’s hypothesis are 
intriguing for the actor.  If we can simulate a body state using neural maps, as the evidence suggests, 
then this could be the mechanism that supports the actor’s belief in imaginary circumstances.  If the 
as-if loop can create accurate simulations that are not quite as exhausting as the full-blown 
emotional state, it has obvious advantages for the actor who must move rapidly from one scene to 
another with entirely different demands, not to mention repeating the whole exercise the following 
night.  If, for example, the actor successfully activates a neural map of fear in the brain and this helps 
to create a convincing portrait of Macbeth, but the process is not accompanied by the cortisol 
release characteristic of real fear, could that explain why the sensation of acting fear is pleasurable 
but the experience of actual fear is not?  In short, is there a potential convergence between two 
hypotheses: affective emotion and the as-if body loop?  Bearing in mind Blair’s warning about 
misusing cognitive science, I decided to ask Damasio himself if he thought these two ideas might be 
connected.  His reply was unequivocal: “You are correct, the most effective way of accounting for 
‘affective emotions’ (a bad term, by the way), is by invoking my as-if-body-loop.”26  
Notwithstanding Damasio’s certainty about the relationship between the two concepts, the link is, 
of course, currently unproven and remains an intriguing hypothesis.  I do, however, agree that there 
seems to be something unsatisfactory about the term “affective emotion.”  Doesn’t all emotion have 
an affective quality, so isn’t non-affective emotion a logical impossibility?  If so, “affective emotion” 
is tautology.  I prefer to borrow the Russian term “scenic,” often used in phrases such as “scenic 
movement” or “scenic speech,” i.e. movement or speech that is suitable for the stage.  I suggest that 
the generation of scenic emotion is one of the targets of training systems in the Stanislavskian 
tradition, which are so dominant in the UK Conservatoire.  But derivations of the Stanislavskian 
approach are by no means the only way of producing similar results.  I discovered this from personal 
experience of an Alba Emoting course in August 2014.  Alba is an actor training technique that 
consciously avoids the “Method” approach of drawing on personal experience.  It makes use of three 
controllable elements of emotional expression, breathing, facial expression and body posture.  Alba 
identifies six basic emotions, fear, anger, tenderness, erotic love, joy and sadness, each of which has 
a characteristic pattern of expression.27  In the early stages, executing the patterns can feel 
mechanical and artificial, but persistent and accurate practice can result in the experience of what is 
known amongst practitioners as “induction,” i.e. the subjective experience of the target emotion.  I 
remember executing the pattern for sadness while lying on my back with limbs waving in the air in 
what FitzMorris practitioners call the “happy baby” pose.  I experienced the induction of sadness, 
with no recourse whatever to emotion memory and no ensuing chain of associations.  I simply 
experienced the quality of sadness, which to an extent I could make come and go according to my 
execution of a physical exercise.  Although the state had the distinctive quality of sadness, it was 
enjoyable to play.  A different route, it seems, to the same end.   
To sum up, subjective experience and actor training lore generates anecdotal evidence of a type of 
emotion that is unique to the stage, which I have called “scenic emotion.”  Contemporary neurology 
suggests there could be a biological foundation to what acting practice began to explore some 
hundred years ago.  A fuller understanding of how the art and science of emotion might connect, 
could provide a firm foundation for an approach to the emotions that extends beyond specific 
training traditions and beyond national training cultures.  This is an area that convergent research 
has only just begun to explore.  
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